


Civilian Research Project USAWC Fellow

Southern Africa's Transnational Threats

by

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United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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Abstract

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There are numerous criminal activities identified within the eleven States that make up the south region. Independently these crimes would normally be considered a matter for local authorities and not relevant to the construct of strategic development. However, this report's theory suggests that the criminal activities occurring between southern African states have strategic implications on AFRICOM's ability to accomplish its security initiatives. Therefore, this report will proceed in three stages. First, what are the nexuses and the cause for the explosion in transnational crimes in the region? Second, what effects does this nexus have on the Southern Region directly and inevitably on AFRICOM's mission? Finally, what actions should be taken by AFRICOM to help deter this nexus and dissuade future criminal activities?

Southern Africa's Transnational Threats

It is not an exaggeration to say that the relationships of the 54 countries which make up the Area of Operation (AO) for the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) are complex. These nations contain a multitude of religious beliefs, cultures, governance forms, and languages. This mixture, coupled with an often-impassable geography and weakened states, have led to endemic corruption, national fragmentation, recurrent insurgencies, and frequent political instability. Upon this scene a host of non-state international actors pursue a range of agendas, from peacekeeping and nation building

U.S. AFRICOM

Mission

"U.S. Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development."¹

to drug smuggling and weapons trafficking. These overlapping dynamics result in a monumental task for AFRICOM's mission which includes strengthening Africa's stability. The AFRICOM Commander has acknowledged these challenges, and has developed a range of goals, objectives, and activities to address them. In an address to the House Armed Services Committee in February 2012, the AFRICOM Commander listed the East Africa Region as his top priority effort. He also stressed his secondary priorities by highlighting efforts in Africa's north, west, and central regions. The Commander was explicit about the United States security interests in the continent; the threats that exist;

and the overall aim of having Africans address the continent's security challenges.

However, the continental challenges in the southern region were not addressed. A part of AFRICOM's mission is to "deter transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development,"¹ This report examines these threats within the southern region of Africa.

In August 1992, selected African states signed a treaty, which established the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The purpose of this treaty was “to ensure, through common action, the progress and well-being of the people of Southern Africa.”² This treaty identified 1) the initial ten African states, (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe); 2) areas of cooperation; and 3) different levels of institutions.

Today the SADC’s membership includes fifteen African States (Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South




Figure 1. Countries of South Region of Africa

Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) that support the SADC’s initiatives which are identified within the treaty. However, the alignment of Southern African States illustrated within AFRICOM’s February 2012 report is not consistent with SADC. As such, this report’s attention will be on AFRICOM’s depiction of the African southern region states (Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).³

There are numerous criminal activities identified within the eleven States that make up the south region. Independently these crimes would normally be considered a matter for local authorities and not relevant to the construct of strategic development. However,

this report's theory suggests that the criminal activities occurring between southern African states have strategic implications on AFRICOM's ability to accomplish its security initiatives. Therefore, this report will proceed in three stages. First, what are the nexuses and the cause for the explosion in transnational crimes in the region? Second, what effects does this nexus have on the Southern Region directly and inevitably on AFRICOM's mission? Finally, what actions should be taken by AFRICOM to help deter this nexus and dissuade future criminal activities?

NEXUS

Given the recent insurgent activities in Mali, and post conflict issues in Libya and Egypt, the concern for criminal activities in the southern region of Africa has lessened. The violence occurring in these regions of the continent has captured global attention. However, in the midst of these events criminal activity has increased in southern Africa. In some incidents, the southern region states have become victims of its successes. For example, South Africa can boast about its major maritime and aviation infrastructures, however, it makes them an ideal transit point for criminal activities within the region. While recent discovery of natural gas near the coast of Mozambique promises long term funding, the country still must address widespread corruption and a poor banking system.⁴ Although many of the southern states can stake claim to conflict-free borders, "rampant corruption within the public and private sectors lends evidence to sophisticated criminal activities."⁵ As regional organizations contemplated on how to prevent and/or deter these crimes, the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organization

(SIPO) was adopted by SADC to help bring about positive change.⁶ Numerous public news sources have identified prolific trafficking occurring among southern regional states.⁷ Seizure reports have indicated that the production and distribution of Cannabis (also known as marijuana) is prevalent throughout Southern Africa. In most incidences, Cannabis profits dwarfs local income standards, which makes it an ideal business within underprivileged communities. Many other illegal drugs have found their way into southern Africa. Cocaine, heroin, amphetamines and methamphetamines have all been identified throughout the southern region, each having links to cross border activities.

Other illicit activities that are occurring between the border states include human trafficking, counterfeit currency, fuel smuggling, smuggling of rare species and resources, money laundering, and smuggling of stolen vehicles. All of these events share a common trait. They each imply a level of sophistication similar to organized crime. When individuals or groups conspire to conduct illicit activities over state borders law enforcement becomes complicated in southern Africa. This is basically due to the inconsistencies in laws and policies among the neighboring states. As a result, perpetrators take full advantage of this complexity in order to facilitate their business. The SIPO II (the 2012 revised version presented by SADC) initiative was designed to address this regional problem. SADC, through SIPO II, commissioned the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) to help defeat these transnational threats.⁸

While there is no single reason why these criminal activities are occurring throughout the region, public reports do infer some similarities. In this report, causality is considered through a social, economic and political aspect. Most often perpetrators

commit crimes to benefit themselves in some way, and the high level of poverty and unemployment coupled with systemic corruption are all factors that could provide some level of explanation. The data presented in tables 1 and 2 offer a general perspective associated with each southern state, and their rankings among other countries. This view depicts some trends that are considered vulnerable to the influence of illicit activities, and possible violent extremist organizations – as well as displays which states required more governmental/policy reform assistance in order to reduce the impact of transnational threats.

Table 1. Southern African State's Data								
	Population (million)	GDP Growth rate	Rank (out of 217)	Unemployment	Rank (out of 201)	CPI Score (out of 100)	Rank (out of 174)	Education Spending (% of GDP)
South Africa	48	3.1%	119th	24.9%	174th	43	69th	5.4%
Zambia	13	6.6%	36th	14.0%	139th	37	88th	1.3%
Zimbabwe	12	9.4%	8th	95.0%	201st	20	163rd	N/A
Mozambique	23	7.5%	20th	21.0%	162nd	31	123rd	5.0%
Botswana	2	3.8%	89th	7.5%	85th	65	30th	8.9%
Madagascar	22	1.9%	146th	2.3%	128th	32	118th	3.0%
Malawi	16	4.3%	77th	N/A	N/A	37	88th	4.2%
Lesotho	1.9	4.3%	76th	45.0%	190th	45	64th	12.4%
Swaziland	1.3	-2.9%	210th	40.0%	187th	37	88th	7.8%
Namibia	2.1	4.0%	81st	51.2%	194th	48	58th	6.4%
Mauritius	1.3	3.4%	102nd	21.4%	48th	57	43rd	6.4%
Average	12.96	4.1%	87.64th	32.2%	150.8th	41.09	84.73rd	6.1%
Data source is "The World Fact Book" linked from Central Intelligence home page at "Publication", https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html (accessed February 17, 2013)								
CPI data: "Corruption Perception Index," December 2012, linked from Transparency International home page at "Publication," http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publications (accessed February 17, 2013)								

Table 2. Example Criminal activity relationship

	From	through	To	Source
Cigarettes smuggling	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	South Africa	Page 15. The smuggling of cigarettes is regarded as a priority crime by SARPCCO
Smuggling	Zambia		Zimbabwe	Page 14 & 15. The smugglers load boats with Zimbabwean ivory, cigarettes, liquor and fish to sell to Zambians.
Firearms	Angola		Namibia	Page 18. Firearm trading is rife on the Angolan side and police suspect that automatic weapons entering Namibia do so from Angola
DVDs and CDs	South Africa		Mozambique	Page 18. Typically a network would include the producers of the DVDs and CDs in South Africa, smugglers who transport the goods from South Africa to Mozambique
Fuel	South Africa, Botswana	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Page 20. Fuel is smuggled into Zambia on trucks driving from South Africa through Zimbabwe, and also out of Zambia into fuel-shortage-prone Zimbabwe
Counterfeit	Tanzania	Zambia & Zimbabwe	South Africa	Page 21. Fake money found in Zambia had its source in Tanzania and Tanzanians have identified markets for their fake US dollars in South Africa.
Cannabis	South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia		National and International markets	Page 23. the listed states are the major cannabis-producing countries in the region. Smaller plantations for local use and distribution are found in Angola, Botswana, Namibia and Mauritius.
Cocaine	International actors	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, Swaziland	Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia	Page 29. various states in the region have a significant number of their indigenous people arrested as "Mules"
Methaqualone	China & India	Mozambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia	South Africa	Page 30. Methaqualone, which is the main ingredient in the street drug called mandrax
Page 31: "Another major dilemma stems from the fact that South Africa's neighbours do not have legislation concerning abalone, which is only found in South African waters. Because of these differences in legislation, abalone can easily be flown directly to Hong Kong after having entered South Africa in containers marked as being in transit. There is therefore a need for greater cooperation between SADC countries in this regard and more alignment in the region's policies on abalone poaching."				
Heroin	Mauritius		Tanzania	Page 32. In South Africa, Tanzanian and Nigerian syndicates appear to control heroin distribution. In other Southern African countries, locals sell and trade in the illicit substance.
Stolen vehicles	Tanzania		South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya, Botswana, Zambia	Page 36. Tanzanian syndicates cooperate with syndicates in South Africa, Mozambique, Kenya and Botswana. Tanzanian nationals have also teamed up with hijacking syndicates in Zambia. Page 37. Zambia is also the largest source country for stolen vehicles for the DRC and Tanzania.

Annette Hubschle, "Organized Crime in Southern Africa," First Annual Review, December 2010, linked from Institute for Security Studies at "Publications," <http://www.issafrica.org/default.php> (accessed October 2012) 3.; Yuri Fedotov, "World Drug Report 2012," June 2012, linked from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime at "Documents," No. E.12.XI.1 2012, <http://www.unodc.org> (accessed October 2012)

Causes

In determining possible causes for criminal activities, a country's social and economic aspect provides a form of evidence which can lend to its current assessment and future direction. The analysis depicted in Table 3 was based upon a collection of public data and encompasses a momentary view into possible weak and failing states. "In today's world, with its highly globalized economy, information systems and interlaced security the ramification of one failed state poses a challenge nationally as well as

	Category	Score (out of 120)
South Africa	Warning	66.80
Zambia	Very High Warning	85.90
Zimbabwe	High Alert	106.30
Mozambique	Very High Warning	82.40
Botswana	Warning	66.50
Madagascar	Very High Warning	82.50
Malawi	Very High Warning	88.80
Lesotho	High Warning	79.00
Swaziland	Very High Warning	83.50
Namibia	High Warning	71.00
Mauritius	Stable	44.70
Adverage		77.95

Nate Haken, J. J. Messner, Krista Hendry, Patricia Taft, Kendall Lawrence, Tierney Anderson, Raphaël Jaeger, Natalie Manning, Felipe Umaña, Amelia Whitehead, "Failed States Index 2012", link from The Fund for Peace, <http://www.fundforpeace.org> (accessed February 27, 2013) 11.

internationally,"⁹ The startling fact is among the states that make up the southern region of Africa, over half are considered at risk.¹⁰ Prolonged social and economic issues encourage public resentment and lessen the respect for authority and rule of law. This type

of atmosphere ignites criminal activity and leads to unwanted conflicts. For example, "between 2007 and 2011 Mozambique experienced violent protests over rising food prices, and in South Africa, as the economy tanked frustrations over inequality in the distribution of basic services lead to prejudiced violence against migrants and foreigners."¹¹ The proliferation of crime can also be attributed to high unemployment

rates. Among the eleven southern states, the unemployment average was 32.2% of the total population. Decreased job opportunities increase criminal involvement and legitimize criminal organization because of its ability to provide a steady means of income. In a weak or failed state, “this relationship often includes political indicators that are associated with state legitimacy, public service and human rights.”¹²

An abundance of issues can be associated with legitimacy; however, corruption is the most prevalent in southern Africa, in particular, political corruption. As noted in Table 1, Zimbabwe’s corruption perception index is the worst among the eleven southern states – and this distinction is echoed by the Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa which stated, “according to our findings the Mugabes (Zimbabwe’s President) and senior ZANU PF officials have cheated Zimbabwe out of billions of dollars.”¹³ The SADC members recognized the prevalence of political corruption and have taken measures to counteract this proliferation. Their initiatives included the development of protocols against corruption (SPAC); partnering with the African Union convention on preventing and combating corruption (AUCPCC); and partnering with the UN convention against corruption (UNCAC).¹⁴ However, several southern states still have not completely endorsed these initiatives and their defiance continues to validate public perception and exacerbate criminal activities.

Public service is related to the essentials that are required for modern life. These services are provided by the government for the betterment of its citizens regardless of their status. Education, health, water, electricity, roads, security, energy and other related assistance make up public service and are considered indicators of weak or failing states.¹⁵ Within the southern region of Africa, the police departments are

commonly identified as the most corrupted public service. The solicitation of bribes was common among most cases. For example, in Zambia “police officers have been known to hold unnecessary roadblocks to create opportunities for collection of bribes.”¹⁶ In Mauritius, the public filed 70 complaints of corruption against police officers in 2006, while in South Africa “corruption has been found to play a role in vehicle hijackings, either with police colluding with hijackers or the traffic department taking bribes for licensing and registration of stolen cars.”¹⁷

Governments are designed to assist and protect the people which fall under its rule and human rights are indicators of this responsibility. A state’s ability to provide freedom of press, civil liberties, political freedom, and to prevent human trafficking, religious persecution, and torture are all essential aspects.¹⁸ In this regard, many of the southern states are not addressing their governmental responsibilities. Each of these aspects is important; however, the proliferation of human trafficking offers an insight into the national and international nexus that prevails throughout the southern region. A study by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has shown that South Africa is “a destination country for long-distance flows for people (mainly women) trafficked from Thailand, Philippines, India, China, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and the Ukraine, and people trafficked within the African continent are mostly from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho.”¹⁹ This prevalence is clearly an indication of organized crime seizing the opportunity afforded by weak or failing states, and until these states can effectively address their issues criminal activity will continue to increase.

Effects

Prolonged criminal activities have many adverse effects on a state. Economically, states can suffer major losses through untaxed revenue that is generated within criminally associated black markets. Socially, criminal activities can create networks that interrupt education, health and safety standards, communities, civil liberties and ultimately lead to social injustice throughout. There are many other issues associated with crime; however, within the context of transnational crimes within the southern region of Africa this section will examine two main effects. First is the public frustration associated with corruption. This aspect is the overall grievance associated with the general population and how their search for solutions could translate into support for terrorist ideologies. Secondly, is the proliferation of a shadow economy and how this environment is conducive to violent organization and terrorist groups. These two perspectives will be gauged against AFRICOM's main initiatives in order to determine their effects on the overall mission.

Throughout history people have demonstrated their frustration toward injustice. The actions of the oppressor committed on the mistreated often reach a breaking point. This point can be ignited in a multitude of ways which ultimately leads to a united effort against the oppressor. Galtung argued "that the situation most likely to provoke aggressive behavior is one in which individuals find themselves in a state of disequilibrium along various socio-political dimensions of status."²⁰ This is evident in Zambia when supporters of the United Party for National Development (UPND) clashed with government authorities and local police outside of a court house in Livingston regarding election fraud.²¹ Additional evidence is provided in South Africa "where a 27-

year-old citizen of Mozambique was handcuffed to the inside of a police van and then dragged across the road and later died from his injuries. This incident was captured on video and ignited public uproar.”²² When corruption occurs throughout, especially within public institutions, people will gravitate towards any gleam of hope that can change the status quo. These solutions could be acts of violence or of peaceful demonstrations as long as the desired outcome can be achieved. As a result, a frustrated population becomes fertile ground for extremist Left-Wing and Right-Wing ideology. “Left-Wing ideology involves the destruction of capitalism and the repressive state, while Right-Wing ideology draws its inspiration from a variety of principles and beliefs, including neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, racism and opposition to foreigners and immigration.”²³ Although the development of terrorist organizations within southern Africa is beyond the scope of this report, it is however important to acknowledge associated effects of prolonged corruption with terrorist characteristics in order to develop successful deterrence measures.

The second effect of prolonged criminal activities in southern Africa is the creation of the shadow economy. “Shadow economic activities are activities that are underground, covert, or illegal.”²⁴ These activities are sophisticated networks that usually incorporate national and international actors who flourish beneath the detection of government authorities. The illegal smuggling of cigarettes within the southern region is an example of this phenomenon. The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) reported that the “majority of counterfeit cigarettes in the region come from China, and Zimbabwean cigarettes are also common in the region and are smuggled from Zimbabwe into Mozambique and South Africa.”²⁵ Although this

activity appears to be a victimless crime, “South Africa alone comprises 13.5 per cent of the market share and the government lost billions in taxes as a result.”²⁶ Clearly this activity has an indirect effect on South Africans. The challenge presented before the southern region of Africa is accurately defining and identifying those transnational shadow activities, and once each state is of one accord, steps can be taken to minimize the lost revenue. The underground economy can be found in every country throughout the world and its presence could never be completely eradicated. Some might even suggest that the existence of the shadow economy plays a vital role in the macro view. However, the dominance of the shadow economy within the southern region is an indication of the depth of corruption within the region. This phenomenon is not exclusively monetary. Often goods and services are exchanged as a method of payment. This type of activity is equally threatening due to its ability to establish routine business relation with criminals and possibly terrorist organizations. So, why should AFRICOM be concern about this effect? “Reducing or eliminating the shadow economy is important because of its ability to finance terrorist organizations, and particular concern should be given if this aspect of the shadow economy is discovered to be financing global terrorism.”²⁷

As AFRICOM prepares to receive a new commander, the priority of focus remains with terrorist groups outside of the southern region of Africa. The incoming commander acknowledged this focus when he stated before the confirmation hearing that “the four major military threats in Africa are: 1) al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, which is at war with French troops in Mali, 2) al Shabaab in Somalia, 3) Boko Haram in Nigeria; and 4) Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army.”²⁸ Although each of these terrorist

organizations has different motivational factors they still share a common trait that is vital for their success (Recruiting and financing). Terror must be sustained and funded, and in sufficient quantity to help terrorists meet their goals.²⁹ As a result, developing human intelligent lines of communication is vital within the southern region. Over 144 million people make up the southern region of Africa, which is a significant recruiting pool that can easily sustain a terrorist organization. Therefore, in order to negate Left and Right Wing terrorist ideology that could attract potential recruits, plans must be developed to assist in suppressing prolific corruption and the threat of weak and failed states.

AFRICOM's initiative is composed of disrupting terrorist stabilizing activities and monitoring the southern region could assist in this effort. The total sum of profits from criminal activities within the southern region was not available. However, estimates concerning Cannabis profits within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) can provide an excellent analogy for the finance potential of the south region. The DRC borders Zambia to the north and offers similar Cannabis production and distribution network as seen in the south region.³⁰ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that the DRC grossed around five million US dollars a year from Cannabis trafficking,³¹ and given the proliferation of Cannabis use as indicated in UNODC world drug reports,³² it is reasonable to apply this profit margin to this scenario. If three of the eleven states that make up the south region produced \$5 million in gross profit from Cannabis trafficking, then \$15 million total becomes available. If half of this profit (\$7.5 million) goes towards a terrorist organization, then this becomes more than sufficient funding to meet the goals of a terrorist group. We must be mindful that this

scenario does not take into account Cannabis profits from the remaining eight states, profits that are generated from illegal smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering and counterfeit or other illegal activities. This “funding could easily create an infrastructure where terror organizations can operate, finance themselves, and carry out attacks on the very sociopolitical system that unwittingly supports them. Therefore, a comprehensive approach to combating terrorism thus requires significant monitoring of the southern region.”³³ As such, the criminal nexus within the southern region of Africa becomes very appealing to al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, al Shabaab, Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army.

Possible Solutions

“Small-Footprint” concept

Unlike northern Africa, the opportunity for immediate democratic change and removal of dictators is not present within the southern region of Africa. Although political tension exists in many of the southern states, none are experiencing situations similar to Libya, Mali, or Egypt. Therefore, any course of action that calls for change must encompass the support of the current leadership. Change will not only require an adaptable and strategically targeted approach,³⁴ but also the acceptability of national and international actors. The AFRICOM Commander stated that “throughout Africa, small teams of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, DOD civilians and contractors, along with teammates from many other U.S. government agencies, conduct a wide range of engagements in support of U.S. security interests.”³⁵ These teams

represent AFRICOM's vision of a small-footprint concept. So, how can this concept be implemented throughout the southern region? A twofold proposal should be considered. First, work through the SADC organization to establish unity of effort and trust. This regional organization has a 15 state membership and 11 of the states fall within AFRICOM's south region. Second, develop a diverse team whose primary objective is security sector reform (SSR) initiatives. SSR core principles are not only conducive for SADC, but it is also in alignment with AFRICOM Commander's Prepare-Prevent-Prevail initiative.³⁶ This is not an all-encompassing solution. It is merely designed to open the door for dialect into a region with increasing transnational threats. This association would help increase the validity of AFRICOM in the south; improve the command's ability to draw on local human intelligence, and ultimately transition into increased civil-military relationships.

Civil – Military Relation

The uniqueness of AFRICOM's mission places emphasis on aid and stability strategies which implies dependency on external organization's subject matter experts. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations, European Union, African Union, and others have many years of experience partnering with states in order to achieve common goals. As such, AFRICOM has taken advantage of this expertise through its many initiatives within Africa. However, its efforts fall short in the southern region of Africa.

Civilian and military relationships in many of the southern states are complex. Often the States' leaders are direct products of the military and/or militia, and deciding to

lessen the military's political role could result in negative support for the current regime; thereby, decreasing the effectiveness of any reform initiatives. AFRICOM must avoid establishing a one-size fit all concepts when considering civil-military strategies in the south region, and keep at the forefront the historic factors associated with each regime.

There are several regional organizations among the southern states, and their goals do not all coincide. However, as the Transparency International survey suggested the police force requires the most attention.³⁷ The police are often the first line of defense for the general public, and their proficiency and professionalism can set the stage for successful reform initiative. Therefore, AFRICOM should consider establishing a relationship with SARPCCO. "It is a strategic consensus that the most important way that Police can contribute to the prevention and control of corruptions is by mobilizing the public to become co-producers of public safety."³⁸ In order to encourage this type of public cooperation, local authorities must gain the confidence of the people. Public trust in local police could resonate throughout and ultimately limit international actor's involvement and enhance reform. However, this effort cannot depend solely on bottom up initiatives. State government must illustrate positive reforms that coincide with community endeavors. "The less capable state authorities are of quelling corruption on their own, the greater the need for foreign military action."³⁹ Establishing new civil-military relationships is not only in line with AFRICOM's small-foot-print concept, but also inspires self-sufficiency among African states.

AFRICOM's focus on the southern region of Africa is not completely quiescent. Quality training occurred with Malawian soldiers through the command's Africa Deployment Assistant Partnership Team (ADAPT).⁴⁰ Additional initiatives include

medical exercises (MED ACCORD)⁴¹ and peacekeeping exercises (SOUTHERN ACCORD)⁴² with Botswana. AFRICOM can also pay tribute to its Africa Partnership Station (APS) which is a series of activities designed to build maritime safety and security with numerous countries which includes Mauritius, Mozambique, and South Africa.⁴³ However, with budget sequestration, AFRICOM's priority of effort must be internally scrutinized in order to stay true to its mission of deterring and defeating transnational threats.

Economical deterrence measures are more cost efficient for AFRICOM than deploying conventional or large assistance assets. This strategy would place emphasis on preventive policies/techniques and penalty measure assistance. Preventive measures are the defensive aspect of deterrence, and penalties are the offensive aspects.⁴⁴ Generally the success of a deterrence strategy is based on the attacker's belief that a retaliation can and will be carried out. Therefore, the defender's creditability must be sound. However, with an average Corruption Perception Index score of 41.09, the data in Tables 1 and 3, suggest the southern region has limited creditability. So, how can AFRICOM assist in helping southern states deter corruption? An effective method of achieving this goal is establishing a partnership that is ready and relevant. Such a relationship would stress the importance of achieving goals and objectives that are important to the regional leaders vs. AFRICOM's objectives. While global terrorism is a universal concern, its importance defer from country to country. In the southern region of Africa, the large percentage of unemployment suggests that security and stability issues are more relevant than global terrorism. Therefore, any international actor who can provide positive assistance would automatically become important to the

leaders of the southern region. AFRICOM has the assets available to assist the southern region in developing interdependency and counter-productivity deterrence strategies. “Interdependency suggests that the more both parties agree on the commonality of an interest, the more costly an attack becomes for both. While counter-productivity conveys that a defender can convince potential attackers that a tactically successful attack will frustrate larger strategic or normative goals; thereby, keeping the attacker at bay.”⁴⁵ These components could assist in establishing a strong and effective deterrence strategy.⁴⁶

Conclusion

The African continent is enormous and the multitude of issues is just as big. It is impractical to expect AFRICOM to establish a presence in every country. The command's immediate threat is clearly the terrorist activities occurring outside of the southern region, and the security interest of the United States dictates that global terrorism be dealt with as swiftly as possible. However, the challenge associated with this task will intensify given the current budget restraints. Every combatant command will have to comprise a plan that supports doing more with less. However, distant and recent historical events have taught us not to underestimate our opponents. Therefore, if an opportunity to defeat the enemy early presents itself, AFRICOM should take the initiative to do so. If this victory can be obtained without the cost of conflict or conventional forces, the better it would be for all parties involved. The southern region of Africa offers this opportunity, and as implied throughout this report, establishing

success will require assisting the southern region in curtailing its transnational threats. As previously stated, over half of the southern countries are at risk of becoming weak or failed states and their social, economic and political standings are the contributing factors. If AFRICOM can successfully establish an influential relationship with some of the southern regional organizations, significant progress could be achieved.

This report touched on the criminal connection between neighboring states (table 2) in the south region, and how the plethora of illegal trafficking has penetrated into the fabric of both public and private sectors. Corruption is rampant throughout the region, and is often seen as normal behavior which can exacerbate criminal activities.⁴⁷ The causes of these criminal relationships were viewed through the aspects of weak and failed states in order to determine possible solutions for future endeavors. The effects of these illicit activities was weighted against AFRICOM's overall initiatives, and pointed out the relevance of possible financial and recruiting support to national and international terrorist organizations. The proliferation of criminal activity in southern Africa is a threat to stability initiatives throughout, and must be addressed if AFRICOM is to be successful. The implementation of the above solutions will not be easy. Establishing trusted relationships is time consuming and is often not in cohesion with desired strategic timelines. However, success could bring about much needed human intelligence within a region where AFRICOM is lacking indigenous information, and perhaps more importantly, prevent logistical support from leaving the southern region and gravitating towards known terrorist groups operating in other regions of the African continent.

Endnotes

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